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BOOK REVIEWS
THE

SPIRIT oF LiBiRY:

PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF L-ARaD R AM.

Collected, and with an introduction and notes, by Irving Dilhard. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1952. Pp. xxvii, 262,
$3.50.

"Civilization implies specialization, specialization is forgetfulness of total values and the establishment of false ones, that is
Philistinism . . . We must in practice be specialists; the division
of labour ordains us to know something of one subject and little
of others; it forces Philistinism down our throats . . . Because a
man is an artist is no reason why he is no Philistine, if he is only
an artist and has no sympathy with unartistic activity . . . If he

will be heard himself, he must listen to others; if he hopes to gain
the consideration or respect for his work that he himself feels for
it, he must in a measure abrogate its claims to predominance and
value the work of others."
The principal point of these observations, made in his Harvard
class-day oration by young Billings Learned Hand, is illustrated
in every one of the addresses and papers which Mr. Dilliard has
included in this impressive volume. Learned Hand-he dropped
the name Billings because he thought it pompous-is certainly a
specialist, and perhaps he was predestined to be so, for both his
father and grandfather were judges before him. He himself was
a skilled judge at the age of forty; and from 1909 to 1951 when he
retired from the bench he has judged the people nearly all the days
of his life; and he has done so in causes of such a technical nature
as the Prophet Samuel could never have imagined. As judge,
first in the United States District Court for Southern New York,
to which he was appointed by President Taft; then in the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit to which he was appointed by
President Coolidge in 1924, he has, all in all, written nearly two
thousand opinions; and these, to use Mr. Dilliard's language, on
almost "every conceivable subject from maritime liens to income
taxes, from banks and banking to naturalization and citizenship,
from labor to trademarks." A famous technician indeed, Hand
could be pardoned if he were only that; and hence a Philistine by
'his own definition of the term. But Hand does not need to be
pardoned because he can never be accused. All these papers and
addresses, as well when they deal with courts, judges and the law
as when they give advice to the young females of Bryn Mawr at
their Commencement exercises, reveal a mind not bounded by the
walls of the forum but by those of nature, a mind over which the
shades of his old preceptors at Harvard, William James, George
Santayana and Josiah Royce must be even now rejoicing in the
Elysian Fields.
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Hand's humane and liberal disposition appears nowhere more
conspicuously than in his several appraisals of the work of his
brethren of the bench. Though these appraisals were made
directly for experts in the law, the author contrives to avoid shoptalk* and seeks to find in the labors of the jurist under consideration something significant for the whole community.
Many sophisticated persons not only in law but in other disciplines, and many cynical persons who lay claim to no discipline
at all are saying today that detachment is an illusion; that no mere
mortal is capable of detachment. Hand, however, in commenting
upon his colleague, Judge Thomas Walter Swan, lauds him for
this very quality and asserts that the prime condition of a judge's
success "will be his capacity for detachment . . . we know," he

says, "that men do differ widely in this capacity; and the incredulity which seeks to discredit that knowledge is a part of the
crusade against reason from which we have already so bitterly
suffered."
In his eulogy upon Mr. Justice Brandeis, Hand makes no direct
mention of a single opinion or rule of law or of any other technical
matter; but rather he dwells on that curse of bigness which troubled
the Justice's spirit; and in Aristotelian vein alludes to his belief
that "there could be no true community save that built upon personal acquaintance of each with each; that thus alone could character and ability be rightly gauged" and the "latent richness in all
of us come to flower." Conceding with Brandeis that a return to
the Greek state is impossible in the present time, he warns that a
big state is not necessarily a great one; and he sees Brandeis'
peculiar message for his time in the warning that the big state
will certainly not be the great state unless it cherish spiritual
values: "You may build your Towers of Babel to the clouds . . .
it shall avail you nothing... Not until you have the courage . . .
deeply to believe that each of you is a holy vessel unique and
irreplaceable . . . will you have taken the first steps along the
path of wisdom."
Two ideas dominate Hand's brief but eloquent eulogy of Mr.
Justice Cardozo: "A judge," says he "must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty of an overshadowing past;
but he must discover some composition with the dominant trends
of his time-at all hazards he must maintain that tolerable continuity without which society dissolves, and men must begin again
the weary path up from savagery. This was the problem that
* The reviewer is taldng into consideration only the form in which these papers
appear in this volume. Some of them are here republished from legal journals. Whether
there is more technical material in the original form he has not investigated.
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fascinated Cardozo . . . His solution of the contradiction was his
great contribution to his time." IHand then returns to the subject
.?
of detachment. Cardozo had wisdom. "And what is wisdom.
of
tell
cannot
I
I do not know; like you, I know it when I see it but
wise
the
know:
do
I
what it is composed. One ingredient I think
man is the detached man;" he is the man who "can weigh the
conflicting factors of his problem without always finding himself
in one scale or the other. Cardozo was such a man .
Detachment and a respect for the individual soul are themes
that appear in these papers again and again. Another is a certain
distrust of what pass for the eternal verities. "Have no confidence
in principles that come to us in the trappings of the eternal. Meet
them with gentle irony, friendly skepticism and an open soul,"
says Hand; and he affirms, with a graceful gesture of skepticism
at his own talent as interpreter that this is the burden of the message of Mr. Justice Holmes, a sermon to the effect that mortal
man does not possess the truth and probably never will; but "must
grope his way through the murk" by trial and error.
If this is so, why should not Hand either as philosopher or
judge give full rein to every vagrant social impulse to change, even
to change by violent revolution? The answer seems to be, in part
at least, that this would be failing to "maintain that tolerable continuity without which society dissolves, and man must begin again
the weary path up from savagery." But this is not the whole of
Hand's answer. If eternal verities are to be distrusted, not only
the venerable traditions of the past must be skeptically received
but also the seductive panaceas of the present, "the imperious
nostrums," as he calls them, "which will brook no dissidence."
Such nostrums not only offend skepticism but defy that tolerance
which forms yet another theme of this wise book; and taken together with the rest, conjures up the spirit of liberty--' that spirit
which is not too sure that it is right . . . which seeks to understand
the minds of other men and women . . .' which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias ... the spirit of Him who, near
two thousand years ago, taught mankind that lesson it has never
learned, but never quite forgotten, that there may be a kingdom
where the least shall be heard and considered side by side with
the greatest."
The judge is 'not very hopeful about the preservation of that
spirit in modern America. Having described with a mordant wit
the techniques of advertising and propaganda, he submits "that
a community used to be played on in this way . . . is not a favorable soil for liberty." He has little faith in "liberal weeklies . . .
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[or] American Civil Liberty Unions" to preserve liberty; and as
little in "laws, or courts, or principalities or powers, to secure it.
You may write into your constitutions not ten, but fifty amendments," he declares, "and it shall not help a farthing, for casuistry
will undermine it as casuistry should, if it have no stay but law."
The very political processes in our democracy he sees as potentially hostile to liberty because, viewing them in a realistic Hamiltonian light, he believes them to be little more than the competition of selfish interests. Indeed he goes so far as to assert that
even in our democracy, "Liberty is so much latitude as the powerful choose to accord the weak."
But if Learned Hand is not very hopeful, neither is he altogether without hope. He seems to believe it possible for the powerful themselves to practice some forbearance; and for those who
aspire to be powerful to do the same. He seems to believe it possible, if difficult, for groups and interests to view even their own
aims with some measure of detachment and those who oppose
them with some degree of respect. This hope arises from his continuing faith in the efficacy of the Jeffersonian ideal of education,
-not training in taxidermy or teaching, in merchandising or medicine-but education in the Liberal Arts. 'I conceive," he says,
"that there is nothing which gives a man more pause before taking
as absolute what his feelings welcome

.

.

.

than even the flicker

of a recollection that something of the sort has been tried before,
felt before, disputed before, and for some reason or other has now
quite gone into Limbo . . . In short, I argue that the political life
of a country like ours would . . . tend to escape its greatest danger,

which is the disposition to take the immediate for the eternal, to
press the advantage of present numbers to the full, to ignore dissenters and regard them as heretics, by some adumbration of what
men have thought and felt in other times and at other places . . .
The principles of a common pump . . . are not so important

politically as Keat's Ode on a Grecian Urn."
Whether education of this kind could produce enough men
of Judge Hand's temper really to matter much is a moot question.
If it could, we should see not only the Philistine in the cultural
world but also his counterpart in the political world vanish away
before our eyes; and as learning is secure when every scholar, if
he hopes to gain the respect for his work that he himself feels for
it, in a measure abrogates its claims to predominance, so liberty
is secure when every citizen, prompted by a similar motive, does
the same with his interest. This would be that constans et perpetua
voluntas suum cuique tribuendi in which alone, according to the
Judge, liberty can be secure.
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One wonders whether wise reflections of this sort did not form

the inarticulate major premise that lay behind Judge Hand's
famous decision in Dennis v. United States. Mr. Dilliard, like
many others of the liberal school, seems not to like that decision.
This reviewer likes it; and cannot see how upon the ground of most
of the texts which this book furnishes the judge could have decided
otherwise than he did, even though he does express a skeptic's
distaste for regarding dissenters as heretics. If the dissenters in
question, make it clear that they will countenance no dissent at all,
once they come to power, to indulge them in their conspiracy to
seize power, would be to run to meet what one would most avoid.
Learned Hand is of a temperament too exquisitely balanced to
blunder into this kind of cul de sac or to-invite this kind of frustration.
John T. Horton
Professor of History
Chairman Department of History & Government
University of Buffalo

